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ENFORCING LOYALTY
Ideas are not always free in America
Earl R. Pfeffer
Loyalty is an American obsession. For several generations,
American schoolchildren have been required to pledge alle-
giance to this country and its flag on a daily basis, as if each
sunrise brings with it new temptations and opportunities
for acts unfaithful to the Republic. If an American citizen is
vocal in his or her criticism of governmental policy, his or
her loyalty to the nation is immediately suspect and "na-
tional security" dictates that governmental surveillance of
that individual is in order. In the end, the secrecy which
surrounds those national security measures reduces loyalty
to a kind of blind faith in the decisions of those individuals
who formulate national policy.
Bumperstickers proclaiming "America, love it or leave
it" are familiar reminders that acquiescence to state policies
is generally viewed as the highest form of patriotism. To
"leave" the country in a time of crisis, an act normally
viewed as traitorous, is the recommended course for those
persons who are unwilling to accept conditions as they
are. It is as if treason and political dissent are equivalent
acts.
Although American history has seen the periodic emer-
gence of patriotic citizens organizations, such as the Ameri-
can Protective League during World War I or the America
First Committee in the 1930s, each created to enforce
its particular view of loyalty, the government has consis-
tently been its own best watchdog. It has sought to control
the political ideologies of its employees by instituting oaths
and by conducting inquiries into their political back-
grounds.
People will argue that the watchful concern with loyal,
ty is justified in light of the freedoms we have of speech,
association, and the press. But if protecting those freedoms
requires that those who speak differently be silenced and
that those who associate differently be denied employment
opportunities with the government, then it is only chosen
opinions and particular political alliances which are being
protected.
During the past one hundred years, there has been a
tension between what the government would like to do in
order to accomplish its goal of enforcing loyalty and what
the courts have permitted it to do in furtherance of that
purpose. In the aftermath of the Civil War, for example,
when divided loyalties still threatened the Union's control
over the Confederacy, both the federal and many of the
state governments sought to eliminate perceived subversion
against the victorious North by requiring citizens in par-
ticularly influential positions to take oaths to the effect that
they had never supported the South. In two 1867 cases,
the Supreme Court ruled that laws requiring individuals to
take loyalty oaths as a precondition to their continuing
employment as teachers, preachers, or government officials
could not be enforced. Since the laws were legislative inflic-
tions of punishment without judicial trial and since they
sought to punish individuals for acts that were not punish-
able at the time the acts were committed, the statutes were
found to have violated the Constitution (Ex parte Garland,
71 U.S. 333; Cummings v.Missouri, 71 U.S. 277).
However, the Supreme Court, in deciding these cases,
left unanswered the ultimate question of whether speech or
nonspeech could ever constitute a sufficient threat to the
national interest so as to warrant governmental restriction.
Fifty years later, in 1919, the Court addressed this issue in
three cases of dubious merit: Schenck v. United States, 249
U.S. 47; Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204; and Debs
v. United States, 249 U.S. 211.
In one of these cases, Schenck, Justice Holmes, writing
for the majority, established the vague principle of "clear
and present danger" as the basis for determining the extent
to which the government has an interest in limiting free
speech:
The question in every case is whether the words
used are used in such a nature as to create a clear and
present danger that they will bring about the sub-
stantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent.
[emphasis added]
There was strong criticism at the time that the clear
and present danger doctrine could punish ideas alone, mere-
ly because they were perceived as dangerous. This, in fact,
appears to have transpired in the case of Gitlow v. New
York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925), in which the Supreme Court
upheld a criminal anarchy charge against Mr. Gitlow be,
cause he published two revolutionary pamphlets. The
Court reasoned that the state's police power won out over
First Amendment protections of speech and of the press
because "utterances advocating the overthrow of organized
govern'ment by force, violence, and unlawful means, are so
inimical to the general welfare and involve such danger of
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substantive evil that they may be penalized [by the state] in
the exercise of its police power."
Ironically, Justice Holmes, who had coined the phrase
"clear and present danger," voiced alarm about the ramifi-
cations of the Gitlow decision. In the dissent, he wrote:
It is said that this manifesto was more than a theory,
that it was an incitement. It offers itself for belief, and
if believed it is acted on unless some other belief out-
weighs it or some failure of energy stifles the move-
ment at its birth. The only difference between the ex-
pression of an opinion and an incitement in the nar-
rower sense is the speaker's enthusiasm for the result.
Eloquence may set fire to reason. But whatever may
be thought of the redundant discourse before us it
had no chance of starting a present conflagration. If in
the long run the beliefs expressed in proletarian dic-
tatorship are destined to be accepted by the domi-
nant forces of the community, the only meaning of
free speech is that they should be given their chance
and have their way.
If the publication of this document had been laid as
an attempt to induce an uprising against government at
once and not at some indefinite time in the future it
would have presented a different question.... But the
indictment alleges the publication and nothing more.
[emphasis added)
Gradually the doctrine began to change; today it essen-
tially conforms with Holmes' dissent in Gitlow. In Dennis
v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951), a case in which pros-
ecution of a leading communist under the Smith Act was
upheld by the Supreme Court, the requirement of actionable
intent was established as the criterion which could trigger
the state's police power in First Amendment cases. Dennis
illustrates, however, that a narrowing of the doctrine will
not always provide increased guarantees of free speech.
The federal courts were left with considerable discretion to
determine exactly what "actions" constituted an "intent"
to "overthrow" or "destroy" the government.
Later, free speech was given fuller protection by the re-
quirement that actions must threaten "imminent" danger
before they are held to be illegal. Curiously, those increased
free speech protections grew out of a case in which the gov-
ernment was prosecuting the Ku Klux Klan. Brandenberg v.
Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). In that decision, the Court
overturned the conviction of an Ohio Klan leader for advo-
cating crime, violence, and unlawful methods of terrorism
to accomplish political reform. The Court reasoned that the
state may not forbid advocacy of force or lawlessness "ex-
cept where such advocacy is directed to inciting or produc-
ing imminent lawless action and is likely to produce such
action." [emphasis added]
THE FIGHT AGAINST COMMUNISM:
ENFORCING LOYALTY BY EMBRACING
THE KLAN
This protection afforded to militant racists advocating vio-
lence against blacks and Jews was never afforded to con-
munists and other leftists. Presumably our highest tribunal
has found that the Communist Party, as an organization
"substantially dominated or controlled by foreign powers
controlling the world communist movement," Communist
Party v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 367 U.S. 1
2ALL 1982
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(1961), is less deserving of judicial protection than groups
that for one hundred years have organized and performed
lynchings and have wielded power by intimidation, harass-
ment, and other violent means. While judicial protection of
free speech rights of hate groups is arguably justified in that
it establishes principles through which all people's civil
rights are protected, it is abhorrent that our government
has, at times, gone beyond the protection of these groups
and has actually collaborated with the Klan or the Nazi
Party in their efforts to fight labor organizing and black-
white unity.
In November 1979, a group of Klansmen and Nazis
killed five men who had played prominent roles as union
and community organizers in Greensboro, North Carolina.
These murdered men also happened to be members of the
Communist Workers Party.' The attack might not have oc-
curred but for the efforts of one Bernard Butkovitch, an
agent of the federal government's Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco, and Firearms (BATF).
During the months preceding the murders, Butkovitch
had served as a National Socialist (sic)2 (Nazi) Party
memlber, working toward the formation of an alliance be-
tween North Carolina's Klan and Nazi groups, each of
which alone was numerically weak. Not only did this feder-
al agent help plan the ambush on the communist demonstra-
tors, but according to the testimony of Nazis, Butkovitch
had suggested that the attackers should buy equipment
that would convert firearms into automatic weapons, and
had offered to obtain grenades and explosives with which
the KKK-Nazis could burn down one of their own houses
1. The Communist Workers Party is one of many leftist political
organizations calling itself communist. Differences between
these and other socialist organizations are sometimes great and
sometimes parochial. Anyone interested in a brief survey of the
many left organizations in America should refer to, G. Vickers,
"Guide to the Sectarian Left," The Nation, 230:591-596, May
17, 1980. In most cases, when reference is made to communists,
it is to the Communist Party U.S.A., an organization having its
historical roots in the Socialist Party of Eugene V. Debs. In
1920, it split off from the latter organization for complex
reasons, which included a belief that socialist revolutions in the
industrialized countries would quickly follow the Bolshevik
Revolution and that a revolutionary socialist party was neces-
sary to provide the American working class with leadership
when the anticipated tide of change reached North American
shores. The Communist Party later played a vital role in the
CIO organizing of the 1930s and 1940s. By the 1950s the Party
was broken, a result of its inability to provide continued leader-
ship to American workers after the revelations of the Stalinist
purges and the subsequent shattering of utopian images with
which workers the world over had viewed the Soviet state. But
of equal importance, the Party declined because of harassment
and persecution of its leaders, its members, and its friends.
and then put the blame on the Communist Workers Party
(see Monthly Review, Vol. 33, No. 6, November 1981;
Guild Notes, Vol. X, No. 4, July/August 1981).
This was not an isolated incident of a federal agent act-
ing as a provocateur to impede the efforts of groups working
for social change. There was Gary Thomas Rowe who ad-
mitted that while he worked for the FBI he participated in
beatings and bombings and in the killing of civil rights
worker Violet Liuzzo in 1965. BATF agents were also im-
plicated in the Charlotte Three and Wilmington Ten civil
rights cases. In the latter case the BATF was so blatant in
tampering with witnesses that the convictions were over,
turned by the courts.
The Greensboro murders occurred during an antiKlan
rally organized by the Communist Workers Party. The po-
lice knew that the protestors would be unarmed, as that
was a condition of the permit. The Klan also knew that the
demonstrators would be unarmed, because they had been
told so by Edward Dawson, a former FBI informant who
also worked for the Greensboro police department. Al-
though the rally organizers had asked the police to keep the
location of the rally secret, for they feared Klan and Nazi
harassment, Mr. Dawson made this information known to
his fellow Klansmen. What followed was an execution-style
murder of the five most vocal CWP leaders.
The unprovoked and deliberate nature of the killings
was captured on videotape which was shown at the trial.
However, Dawson and Butkovitch were not called as wit
nesses by the unaggressive prosecutor.
The reaction of the press was predictable: the commu-
nists provoked or at least "welcomed" the attack (see New
York Times editorial, November 20, 1980). The reaction of
the jury was a foregone conclusion: all the defendants were
acquitted of the murder charges on the grounds that they
were acting in self-defense. An observer is left to conclude
that anti-racist, socialist speeches by communists are provo-
cation enough to justify murder.
It appears that the Klan and the Nazi Party make con-
venient allies of the government when it is confronted with
the struggle of black people to form unions and fight racism.
And the perceived danger of anything associated with com,
munism continues to be reflected in the decisions of the na-
tion's highest court, for whom the internationalism of com-
munists and socialists is grounds for suspecting their loyalty
and nationalism. But if the Court's view is correct, what
2. It is ironic that a group which opposes socialism so vehemently
contains the word "'socialist" in its party name. The roots of
this charade can be traced back to Hitlers use of socialist sym
bols in order to draw support for his movement from the work.
ing class.
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about the modern multinational corporation whose invest-
ment policies and sales practices owe allegiance to no coun-
try-only to the profits of its shareholders? Twenty-eight
years ago, scholar Henry Steele Commager asked a series of
rhetorical questions which today are still relevant.
... what are we to say of the attempts by the Na-
tional Association of Manufacturers and by individ-
ual corporations to identify loyalty with the system
of private enterprise? Is it not as if officeholders
should attempt to identify loyalty with their party,
with their own political careers? Do not these corpor-
ations which pay for full-page advertisements asso-
ciating Americanism with the competitive system ex-
pect, ultimately, to profit from that association? Do
not these organizations that deplore, in the name of
patriotism, the extension of government operation of
hydroelectric power expect to profit from their cam-
paign? (H. S. Commager, Freedom, Loyalty, Dissent,
1954, p. 144)
What could be more "American" than the accumula-
tion bf profits? Even when American businesses travel
abroad, closing plants and abandoning communities in the
process, the loyalty of their actions, much less the legality,
has not been scrutinized and challenged by the courts (see
S. Lynd, "What Happened in Youngstown?" Radical
America, Vol. 15, No. 4, July/August 1981). But as inac-
tive as our government has been in challenging the loyalty
of corporations, it has been correspondingly active in ques-
tioning the loyalty of citizens who steadfastly challenge cor-
porate prerogatives.
One way our government has traditionally sought to
enforce loyalty has been by restricting public employment
to those "safe" individuals who do not advocate "sub-
versive" economic and political beliefs. For example, attor-
neys, in applying for federal jobs, must complete Standard
Form 86, "Security Investigation Data for Sensitive Posi-
tion." Questions twenty-one through twenty-three inquire
about political associations which might raise suspicions
about the applicant's commitment to constitutional princi-
ples of government.
There is a bias in these questions toward uncovering
communist associations. By using the word communist and
by specifically inquiring about membership in the Commu-
nist Party of the United States, the questions betray a
belief on the part of our government that communists are
not fit to serve in public positions. On the other hand,
ultraright groups that do not share the Communist Party's
commitment to economic equality and social justice are not
subject to the same screening pr6cess.
.. . patriotism is enforced in
America by equating loyalty
with a devotion to a particular
economic system."
While the questions also inquire about activities within
"fascist," "totalitarian," or "subversive" organizations,
which we might reasonably interpret to include member-
ship in the Ku Klux Klan or the American Nazi Party, there
is no legal basis for requiring individuals of those racist and
para-military organiations to answer the inquiries affirma-
tively, as the responses to the questions depend on the ap-
plicant's personal definition of the terms fascist and totali-
tarian. Klan members or Nazis would in all likelihood
answer all such questions in the negative, as they probably
view their associations as democra-tcally based and in
pursuance of the principles of the Contitution as they see
it? But because the questions specifically inquire about
communist membership, a communist with no intent to
overthrow the government or to make political changes
through anything but democratic and majoritarian initia-
tives would nevertheless be required to answer the ques-
tions affirmatively, at risk of perjury. A militant racist is
under-no such constraint.
4
Research into legal challenges to loyalty oaths and
associational inquiries supports this observation. The vast
majority of eases concern individuals whose "left-wing"
associations and beliefs have led to some form of govern-
mentally imposed restriction on their employment rights.
This raises a number of questions. First, can the gov-
ernment legally require applicants to divulge past political
associations, particularly when that informant might erro-
neously incriminate them and close them off from govern-
ment employment? Second, what is the justification for the
process of equating political leftists with fascists? And, last-
ly, would the presence of communists in the public's em-
3. Indeed, when Representative John Rankin, chairman of the
House Un-American Activities Committee was asked why his
committee did not investigate the Ku Klux Klan, he answered
that the Klan was not "un-American" but was "American"!
(H. S..Commager, Freedom, Loyalty, Dissent, p. 152).
4. A similar bias can be found in federal civil rights legislation. Sec-
tion 703(o of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. §2000e-2(0, permits "unlawful employment practices"
to be committed against communists. Nazis and Klan members,
however, are guaranteed full protection of the law.
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ploy really undermine the social fabric of our society?
DISCREDITING THE LEFT: THE EQUATION
OF DISSENT AND DISLOYALTY IN AMERICA
For most of American history, during wars, rebellions, and
times of national crisis, the oath was the means by which
our government ascertained the loyalty of its citizens. Alex-
ander Hamilton recognized the inherent conflict of the oath
with our legal system when he wrote that it was
a subversion of one great principle of social security,
to wit: that every man shall be presumed innocent
until he is proven guilty. This was to invert the order
of things, and, instead of obliging the state to prove
the guilt in order to inflict the penalty, it was to
oblige the citizen to establish his own innocence to
avoid the penalty. (quoted in Cummings v. Missouri,
71 U.S. 277, 330, [18661)
Today, as oaths are seldom instituted, patriotism none-
thelegs is enforced in America by equating loyalty with a
devotion to a particular economic system. This country,
which has the longest history of freedom of expression of all
modern nations, also has the narrowest definition of loyalty
of all countries having a genuine democratic tradition.
Perhaps it is the revolutionary genesis of this society
"ahi its early rejection of feudal forms and class based loyal-
:ties which subjected it to, and continues to plague it with,
an overriding paranoia -about anything different.
In Europe, loyalty to one's class is not in conflict with
nationalism and patriotism. Socialists head the governments
of several countries and communists wield significant influ-
ence in Italy and France. In America, however, nationalism
is not tied to ancient customs and traditional forms because
it was founded on the initiative and strength of the individ-
ual entrepreneur. Economic growth was our manifest des-
tiny, and allegiance was owed only to those forms and insti-
tutions that furthered the growth of private capital.
America's history has seen numerous periods of patri-
otic awakening. These generally followed wars and times of
national crisis during which people challenged the social
and economic order (see H. Hyman, To Try Men's Souls,
1959). The atmosphere of the early 1950s was a particular-
ly good medium for the development of laws requring oaths
of loyalty. Past court decisions had never ruled on the
constitutionality of loyalty oaths per se, only on the specific
oaths being challenged by particular plaintiffs. Courts per-
mitted loyalty oaths where the state carried its burden of
proving a present and immediate danger to a legitimate gov-
emnment interest.
-According to Justice Vinson, the Communisty Party,
for one, constituted such a danger. In the case of American
Communi&ations Association v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382
"(1950), the Court upheld Section 9(h) of the Taft-Hartley
':A It, which required union officers to file affidavits to the
Oecctcthat they were not members of the Communist Party.
Failure to sign the affidavit meant that their unions could
"not receive 'the services of the National Labor Relations
Bdard, which were necessary to secure the protections and
gu.arantees that the law offered to organized labor. Justice
:Vinson wrote:
Communist leaders of labor unions had in the past
and would continue in the future to subordinate
legitimate trade union objectives to obstructive
strikes when dictated by party leaders.
... [There is sufficient evidence] that commu-
nists and others proscribed by the statute [Section
9(h)] had infiltrated union organizations not to sup-
port and further trade union objectives, including the
advocacy of change by democratic methods, but to
make them a device by which commerce and industry
might be disrupted when the dictates of political poli-
cy required such action.
'Justice Vinson's argument lacks merit on two counts.
First, during the period in which Communist Party mem-
bers had participated in strikes, such strikes were legitimate
trade union tactics. Until 1947, many of the methods for ex-
acting pressure on management which are now illegal were
permissible under the Wagner Act. Apparently, Justice
Vinson considered the Taft-Hartley Act a legal ex post
facto law, rendering illegal those strikes which had been
legally organized at the time.
Second, Justice Vinson's condemnation of the commu-
nists" as undemocratic flies in the face of a significant
amount of data to the contrary. Recent studies of the Uni,
ted Auto Workers and the National Maritime Union by
James Prickett indicate that there was far greater democ-
racy in those unions when communists were prominent
members than after the post-war expulsions ("Communism
and Factionalism in the United Auto Workers, 1939-
1947" 32 -Science and Society 257 11968]; "Communism,
Democracy, and the National Maritime Union," unpub-
- lished thesis, U.C.L.A. library).
Professor-Summers of the University of Pennsylvania
Law School has written that those communist-dominated
unions expelled from the CIO continued to be vigorous and
effective bargaining agents for their members. The United
Electrical Workers Union (UE), one union thrown out of




the CIO for being "communist," continues to be a model
democratic labor organization. It is the one union in the
country in which the officers earn no more than the
members who work in the factories.
It is significant that the final expulsion of so-called
..communist unions" from the CIO occurred when those
unions refused to rally behind the other CIO unions in sup-
port of Harry Truman, choosing instead to support Henry
Wallace. So much for democracy.
Nevertheless, Justice Vinson's view of communists
was and continues to be the predominant one. As loyalty
and anti-communism grew to be synonymous, employees of
both the government and the private sector became subject
to oath requirments and restrictions on their associations.
Louis Weinstock, for example, was expelled from the Broth-
erhood of Painters because of communist affiliations, al-
though for years he had steadfastly worked for unemploy-
ment insurance, doing as much as any "loyal" person to
make it a reality for American workers. But loyalty to the
working class was not considered a patriotic duty.
Communist associations were also legitimate grounds
for dismissal from public employment. This policy persisted
despite the fact that the Communist Party had twenty
years earlier abandoned its call for revolution, seeking in-
stead to work through coalitions and the electoral process.
Moreover, communists were loyal to the American war ef-
fort against Hitler's Germany, supporting labor in its agree-
ment not to strike during the years of conflict.
On the other hand, the record of the self-proclaimed
patriots who were seeking to purge communists and "sym-
pathizers" from public office on charges of disloyalty is not
above reproach. The historical record raises significant
questions about the anti-communists' claims of loyalty, let
alone their ability to determine the criteria for assessing the
loyalty of others. Most revealing is the story of American
industry's romance with Adolf Hitler during the 1930s.
Among Hitler's first acts were a red scare and an attack
on trade unions in Germany. Wages fell to new lows and
hours of labor and requirements for speed-up reached new
highs as the dictator readied Germany for his fantasized at-
tack from the Soviet Union. American industrialists, admir-
ing the growth of profits in Germany as well as Hitler's
successful efforts at disciplining labor unrest, rendered
eager support to the fascist state. Former National Associa-
tion of Manufacturers president H. W. Prentiss commented
that "American business might be forced to turn to some
form of disguised fascistic dictatorship" (Boyer and Morais,
Labor's Untold Story 11955), p. 320ff).
American industrialists joined to form the powerful,
pro-Hitler America First Committee, which set among its
"American industrialists,
admiring the growth of profits in
Germany as well as Hitler's
successful efforts at disciplining
labor unrest, rendered eager
support to the fascist state."
priorities the linking of the New Deal and the CIO with
communism. The National Association of Manufacturers
produced booklets with such titles as "Join the CIO and
Help Build a Soviet America."
One of the most prominent members of the pro-Nazi
America First Committee was John Foster Dulles, our sec-
retary of state during the McCarthy period and a primary
policy maker during the height of the cold war. Dulles's law
firm of Cromwell and Sullivan, representing New York
banks, sent him to Berlin in 1933 to cancel $1 billion of Ger-
man debt and to provide the Nazis with new credit for re-
armament.
Believing that Naziism was "dynamic," Dulles wrote,
"We have to welcome and nurture the desire of the new
Germany to find for her energies a new outlet." This "out-
let" was military expansion into eastern Europe, a direction
hardly alarming to the then senator from Missouri, Harry
Truman, who, despite his distaste for Hitler, saw in the
German leader a means to destroy the development of so-
cialism in Russia. But when the Soviet Union became our
ally against Germany, Truman acknowledged how the pro-
Hitler sympathies of American business were hindering the
American war effort, as when the Senate Committee he
chaired concluded:
The work of the Office of Production Management
and War Production Board has been hampered by
the extent to which their personnel was predomi-
nantly drawn from big business groups. (Senate
Report 480, June 18, 1942, of the Special Committee
investigating the National Defense Program)
American business eventually supported the war
against the Nazis. But what ultimately made the war
against Germany palatable to American entrepreneurs was
not only Hitler's record as a sadistic dictator with a mono-
maniacal hunger for power but also the promise that war




In the end, the representatives of Wall Street were
won over to the government's cause, but at a very high cost
to the American public. In addition to $117 billion in war
contracts, business benefited from $25 billion worth of new
plants and equipment for which they later paid the govern-
ment only 60 percent of the original cost. The profits ac-
cumulated by American industry during the war, an aver-
age of $22 billion annually (twice as large as the profits of
the previous high in 1929), were made possible by the pub.
licly subsidized capitalization of industry.
The monumental profits continued after the war. From
1947 until 1951, American corporations reported net gains
of $113 billion, 1000 percent higher than any of the boom-
ing pre-Depression years. The battle between labor and
capital for this wealth, most of it government subsidized,
formed the basis for the red scare after the war, which,
along with a war scare directed against the Soviet Union,
served to justify the continued military priorities of gov-
ernment and industry; world markets and billions of dollars
of profits were at stake (see H. Magdoff, The Age of Imperi-
alism; Monthly Review Press, 1966).
It was against this background that the fear of leftists
in our government was reborn. Even before Senator Mc-
Carthy initiated his witchhunt, the Chamber of Commerce
produced two pamphlets entitled "Communists in the Gov-
ernment, the Facts and a Program" and "Communists
Within the Labor Movement, Facts and Countermeas-
ures." The defin ition of loyalty was being written by the
very people who had suoported Hitler ten years earlier.
LIBERALIZATION UNDER THE
WARREN COURT
Although the Warren Court never questioned the classifi-
cations being used to determine who was loyal, it is a trib-
ute to the majority of that Court that the use of oaths and
the exclusion of people from jobs based on their beliefs
never became firmly entrenched in our public employment
policy.
In Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960), the Court
ruled that an Arkansas statute requiring teachers at state
colleges and schools to file an annual affidavit listing all
organizations to which they belonged violated the First
Amendment right to associate (which it derived from free-
dom of speech). The Court did not question the "legitimate
and substantial" purpose of the government in excluding
certain individuals from state jobs, but it did direct the
state to find "less drastic means" that did not "stifle funda-
mental personal liberties" in order to achieve its goals. The
Court was not prepared to challenge the legitimacy of the
red scare, but it did find a compelling interest in the protec-
tion of free speech.
-, The following year, a Florida school teacher challenged
a "non-communist oath," which the Court ruled was so
vague that it would lead people to guess at its meaning
'(Cramp v. Board of Public Instruction of Orange County,
Florida, 368 U.S. 278 [1961]). To the extent that teachers
.would forever be uncertain of whether or not their activi-
-ties violated the law, the Court ruled that they were de,
prived of due process rights.
. In. 1964, -the Court used similar reasoning to strike
down a series of oaths which two Washington statutes
,required of state employees (Bagget v. Bullitt, 377 U.S.
360). In other cases the Court ruled that loyalty oaths were
-overbroad," tending to authorize "guilt by association"
and creating penal laws "susceptible of sweeping and im-
proper application."
Again, the Court never questioned the classifications
being used, only the methods of control. Weeding commu-
nists out of government was considered a legitimate exer-
cise, but the Court challenged the government to devise
less obtrusive means for doing it. New techniques for regu-
lating the beliefs of public officials eventually emerged, and
in time the state and federal governments were successful
in having them upheld by the Court.
- In Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 252 (1957), the
California Bar had rejected the petitioner's application for
admission because he refused to answer the Fitness Com
mittee's questions as to his present or past membership in
the Communist Party. The first time his case went to the
highest tribunal, Konigsberg won on the grounds that the
Bar Committee could not treat his mere refusal to answer
questions as a failure to demonstrate "good moral charac-
ter." But in a confusing reversal of their 1957 decision, the
Court, in 1961, ruled that Konigsberg's admission to the
Bar could be denied because he had refused "to provide un,
privileged answers to questions having a substantial rele-
vance to his qualifications" (366 U.S. 36). The questions
being challenged were inquiries into past political associa,
tions.
Although the Konigsberg decision established the gov-
ernment's right to certain information about a person's past
activities, that right is subject to the proviso that continued
employment not be conditioned on the substance of the in-
formation divulged. This proviso was upheld in two later
cases in which the Court ruled that Communist Party mem-
bership or association is not prima facie evidence of dis-




In Keyishian v. Board of Regents of the University of the
State of New York, 385 U.S. 589 (1967), the Court ruled
that a New York plan to prevent employment of "sub-
versives" in the university system was unconstitutional.
The case concerned the legality of two New York statutes.
The first required a disavowal of Communist Party mem-
bership by all university employees. The second gave con-
structive notice of job loss to anyone who by word of
mouth or otherwise deliberately advocated, advised, or
taught the doctrine of forceful overthrow of the govern-
ment.
Five professors refused to sign any declarations of be-
liefs or association, contending that the law, as worded,
proscribed not only the teaching of Marxism but the Dec,
laration of Independence as well. The Court said:
... mere knowing membership without a specific in-
tent to further the unlawful aims of an organization is
not a constitutionally adequate basis for exclusions
from such positions as those held by applicants.
This decision was consistent with a ruling one year
earlier in which the Court struck down an oath binding a
state employee not to become a member of the Communist
Party if done with knowledge of the Party's unlawful pur-
pose. Elf brandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11 (1966). The Court
said that: ". . . proscription of mere knowing membership
without any showing of 'specific intent' would run afoul of
the Constitution."
This decision represented the Court's growing aware-
ness that mere membership in the Communist Party did not
signify unconstitutional or illegal purposes.5 With this new
approach, the Court was able to protect the First Amend-
ment rights of individuals to believe and associate freely
without ever moderating its established position that the
Communist platform, if it ever materialized, would be illegal
and unconstitutional.
The Court's failure to reevaluate the latter position
proved to be significant in the later development of its doc-
trine on associational investigations. The Court's continu-
ing belief in the dangers of communism was eventually used
by the Burger Court as the reason for upholding the consti-
tutionality of associational inquiries, undermining many of
the Warren Court's protections.
What makes the Court's anti-communist position un-
5. As discussed earlier in the article, .,specific intent" was subject
to wide judicial interpretation. The requirement that danger to
the government be "imminent" did not develop until three
years after Ellbrandr.
tenable is the fact that the proclaimed "illegal" goals of the
Communist Party-government overthrow by force or vio
lence-were never the focus of Party activities, if they were
goals at all. As Albert Maltz, one of the "Hollywood Ten"
blacklisted in the 1950s because of Communist Party con-
nections, has said:
... the Communist movement at that time [1930s
and 1940s) stood for many good things. It was the
Communist movement that was organizing the un-
employed. It was the Communist movement that
raised the slogan of "'Black and White, Unite and
Fight!" and that spoke out against world racial dis-
crimination. It was the Communist movement that
was very important in the organizing of the CIO and
the industrial unions.
And, if you furthermore had read the Marxist
classics, you found what I still think to be the noblest
set of ideals ever penned by man.... [Wihere else in
political literature do you find thinkers saying that we
were going to end all forms of human exploitation?
[Quoted in V. Navasky, Naming Names, 19801
If one disagrees with those goals, or even with the way
the Communist Party was organized to achieve them, one
still cannot attack them as illegal, un-American, and dis-
loyal unless one believes that national loyalty is synony-
mous with a particular economic system.
Yet, the latter point of view has come to be the pre-
vailing attitude in America today. The socialization of the
means of production and the ideology of equality and collec-
tive responsibility have grown to be considered "'un-Ameri-
can." Anything "socialistic" is against the national interest,
and attempts to change social relations are perceived as at-
tacks on American values (for example, the Equal Rights
Amendment).
At the same time, our government has maintained a
fairly apathetic response to ultra-right organizations which,
while extremist, do not question the prevailing socio-
economic structures and ideologies. Moreover, groups such
as the Ku Klux Klan have proven very useful to those
whose interest it has been to divide the working class and
to discredit alternative political philosophies.
THE BURGER COURT'S RETREAT
Although the Warren Court had repeatedly protected the
right of individuals to associate freely (so long as there was
no evidence of actionable intent to overthrow the govern-
ment), the fact that it continued to cast communist princi-
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... the government may make
employment contingent on
information about a person's past
so long as it does not explicitly
condition the employment on this
information."
ples in illegal tones provided the precedent for the present
Court's position on associational inquiries. In Baird v. State
Bar of Arizona, 401 U.S. 1 (1971), the majority upheld a
challenge to a question on a state bar application, which
asked whether the applicant had ever belonged to an or-
ganization advocating the overthrow of the United States
government by force or violence. The Court reasoned that
"mere membership in an organization can never, by itself,
be sufficient grounds for a state's imposition of civil disa-
bilities or criminal punishment."
Yet, in a similar case decided the same day, the Court
upheld the New York Bar's right to inquire about appli-
cants' associations (Law Students Civil Rights Research
Council v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154 [19711). The Court rea-
soned that the state has a right to information about
"knowing membership" in any organization advocating the
overthrow by force or violence of the government, provided
that the state simultaneously inquires if the applicant car-
ries the specific intent to further the organization's illegal
goals.
This decision resulted from a misapplication of the law,
for prior cases were very clear in holding that it is only
imminent danger arising out of active and purposeful member-
ship in certain "unlawful" organizations, which is contrary
to the state's interest. Previously, "knowing membership"
in an organization had not constituted a sufficient danger to
the state to justify abridgment of freedom of speech and
association. Now, insofar as it might help the state to un-
cover a person's "illegal purposes," "knowing membership"
in an organization is subject to inquiry by the government.
In Wadmond, the Court appeared to be harkening back
to the reasoning of Konigsberg-that an inquiry, which by
itself is judicially forbidden, will be permitted if it is a means
for discovering other information to which the state is legal-
ly entitled. It appears, then, that, under current govern-
mental practices and with judicial authority, belief can ulti-
mately be grounds for the refusal to hire an individual or to
admit an attorney to the bar.
The Court made its position very clear in Konigsberg
and Wadmond: that the government is entitled to any infor-
mation with respect to beliefs and associations if it only in-
tends to use that information to uncover an individual's
past conduct and present intents. In Konigsberg, Justice
Harlan reasoned that the state's interest in having lawyers
devoted to the law, especially its "procedures for orderly
change," outweighed "the minimal effect upon free associa-
tion occasioned by compulsory disclosure" of past associa-
tions. The Court held that past associations might reveal
whether or not the applicant possessed any illegal intent.
Harlan added, however, that there is no possibility of
exclusion because of mere membership in the Communist
Party-a result which would be contrary to present-day
law-because "judicial protection" would be available in
cases of unconstitutional intrusion into rights of associa-
tion. Unless job applicants have actively advocated illegal
activities, the courts presumably will protect them.
It is difficult to share Harlan's sanguine outlook. An
applicant for a federal or state job who must answer ques-
tions about beliefs and associations does not have the judi
cial protection guaranteed in Konigsberg, a case involving a
bar association applicant. Admission to a state bar is dis-
tinctly different from employment. The former is numerical-
ly open; the latter is restricted and closed. A judicial reme,
dy is meaningful to one seeking admission to the bar,
because an opening is always present. Jobs, however, get
filled; positions are limited and are not available to every
qualified applicant. Since many qualified individuals apply
for every job, the government could reject an otherwise
qualified individual for past or present political associations
without being burdened to justify its decision.
It would never have to admit that the reason for not
hiring the applicant was his or her past membership in some
political organization, for action on applications is, to a large
extent, discretionary. The government would only have to
justify its decisions by saying that it believed that other ap-
plicants were more qualified. Therefore, an applicant for a
federal job has no remedies against unconstitutional intru,
sions into his or her beliefs and rights of association. On
these grounds, the present practice of screening prospective
employees for their past associations may be unconstitu-
tional.
It is by now a well-established principle that the state
may compel a citizen to disclose his or her political beliefs or
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